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Market efficiency is a topic that has been thoroughly questioned and examined by various 
economists and market strategists. Market efficiency has been challenged, as anomaly research 
has exposed its limitations within the investment process. Economists and researchers continue 
to study the puzzling nature of asset pricing anomalies and examine various factors’ predictive 
power in understanding where these anomalies come from and how they impact securities’ 
performance over time. The purpose of this study is to further examine asset price anomalies, the 
development of investment strategies, and the success of each investment strategy throughout 
economic upward and downward trends. The methodology includes: identifying anomaly factors 
that have proven their ability to generate excess returns above the market, creating investment 
portfolios that mimic each investment strategy, and analyzing the relationship between the 
anomaly signal and the firm’s total return over time, specifically throughout varying stages of a 
business cycle. The anomaly variables tested include: momentum, value-versus-growth, 
investment, profitability, intangibles, and trading frictions, all of which were examined across 
three definitive time periods: pre-financial crisis (2000-2006), the financial crisis (2007-2008), 
and post financial crisis (2009-2013). The results of the analysis indicate that there is statistically 
significant evidence that there are factors linked to investment strategies that produce abnormal 
returns specific to each sample period. In other words, based upon the research provided in this 
study, conclusions can be made about the relationship between economic conditions and 
effectiveness of investment strategies and about market efficiency itself.  The understanding of 
anomalies and those factors that influence them are important to investors, as they seek to 
generate positive returns on their assets. More importantly, the ability to comprehend how 
markets function, anticipate market outcomes, and formulate fruitful investment strategies is 
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 Market efficiency is a topic that has been thoroughly questioned and examined by various 
economists and market strategists. American economists Harry Roberts and Eugene Fama 
formally posed the question, “Can anyone consistently beat the market?”, classifying market 
efficiency into three forms: weak form, semi-strong form, and strong form. Each form is derived 
from a particular set of information: weak form is based upon the assumption that historical 
pricing data is unable to be used to predict securities’ future prices and/or returns; semi-strong 
form implies that public information has no effect on predicting securities’ future performance; 
and strong form indicates that private information is unable to be used to outperform the market.  
Since the inception of the efficient market hypothesis, there has been widespread research and 
debate in regards to the validity of Fama’s and Robert’s proposition (Zacks, 2011). 
 Market efficiency has been challenged, as anomaly research has exposed its limitations 
within the investment process. Much of this anomaly research has led to the formulation of 
multifactor models that have consistently produced positive risk adjusted returns (Zacks, 2011). 
Significant empirical models such as the ‘CAPM Model’, ‘Fama and French 3- Factor Model,’ 
and the ‘Carhart Four Factor Model’ have been used to explain the variation across asset pricing, 
and thus security and portfolio returns that cannot be explained by the efficient market 
hypothesis.  
 Additionally, economists and researchers continue to study the puzzling nature of asset 
pricing anomalies and examine various factors’ predictive power in understanding where these 
anomalies come from. The understanding of anomalies and those factors that influence them are 
important to investors, as they seek to generate positive returns on their assets. More importantly, 
 9 
the ability to comprehend how markets function, anticipate market outcomes, and formulate 
fruitful investment strategies is powerful for not only investors, but also for the economic 
systems across the globe. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Over the past several decades, several multifactor models have been developed and 
examined to understand the relationship between risk and reward and those factors that influence 
assets’ expected return apart from systematic market risk. In other words, economists and 
investors have continued to identify inefficiencies in the market that have led to asset pricing 
anomalies (Zacks, 2011). Some of the most influential multifactor models that have guided 
investors through the investment process and have proven successful at generating positive 
returns include: the CAPM Model, the Fama & French 3-Factor Model, and the Carhart Four 
Factor Model. 
The CAPM Model is based on several key assumptions and attempts to quantify the 
relationship between risk, which is assumed to be represented by beta, and the expected return of 
a given security. The model assumes that investors: always seek to maximize their expected 
return based upon expected risk, believe in market risk/reward tradeoffs, and choose to hold 
diversified portfolios. The CAPM draws a relationship between assets’ expected returns and the 
level of market risk to which they are exposed through the equation: E(rA) = rf + βA(E(rm ) – rf), 
where rf  is the risk-free rate, βA is the corresponding measure of risk related to the asset, and  
(E(rm ) – rf) is the market risk premium, or the excess return of the market portfolio. In other 
words, the CAPM indicates that an asset’s ability to generate an expected return beyond the risk-
free rate and above the market is purely dependent upon the asset’s beta. This relationship 
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between expected return and beta can be graphically depicted via the Security Market Line, 
shown below (Womack, 2003): 
 
Although the CAPM has proved to be a powerful tool for investors, it does have its limitations. 
According to “Understanding Risk and Return, the CAPM, and the Fama-French Three-Factor 
Model”, written by Kent Womack, “The CAPM models usually achieve an R2 measure of only 
about 0.85. While this relatively high R2 value is one of the main reasons for the popularity of 
the CAPM, it also highlights the fact that roughly 15% of the variation in observed returns still 
remains unexplained” (Womack, 2003). Despite its weaknesses, the CAPM Model has served as 
an important framework for investors and has laid the foundation for more complex multifactor 
models. 
 The Fama & French 3-Factor Model builds upon the CAPM Model, proposing additional 
significant factors in explaining realized returns of securities’ apart from market risk. Fama and 
French concluded that factors encompassing “value” and “size” are important determinates of 
securities’ expected returns and must be accounted for. In order to represent the risks associated 
with value and size, Fama and French introduced the SMB (Small Minus Big) and HML (High 
Minus Low) Factors. The SMB Factor measures the excess return that relatively small market 
capitalization firms generate for their investors; this excess return is also known as the “size 
premium”. The HML Factor measures the excess return that relatively high book-to-market firms 
(Womack, 2003) 
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generate for their investors; this excess return is also known as the “value premium”. Adding 
both the size premium and value premium to the market risk factor postulated by the CAPM, this 
3-Factor Model draws a relationship between an assets’ expected return and market, size, and 
value risk. This relationship is described through the following equation: E(rA) = rf + βA(E(rm ) – 
rf) + sASMB + hAHML, where rf  is the risk-free rate, βA is the corresponding measure of risk 
related to the asset, (E(rm ) – rf) is the market risk premium, sA is the measure of size risk 
exposure, and hA is the measure of value risk exposure. The SMB and HML Factors have grown 
in popularity amongst investors, as their predictive power has proven to be successful time and 
time again (Womack, 2003). That said, this model is still thoroughly examined, as researchers 
continue to identify additional significant factors with great predictive power outside of market 
risk, size risk, and value risk. Evidence has shown that the Fama & French 3-Factor Model fail to 
account for several other asset pricing anomalies (Hou, Xue, Zhang, 2014). 
 Using both the CAPM and Fama & French 3-Factor Model as a framework, the Carhart 
Four-Factor model was developed. The Carhart Four-Factor Model incorporates market, size, 
and value risk, but also includes a momentum factor as a risk variable. This momentum factor is 
described as Up Minus Down, or UMD, and indicates that those securities that have consistently 
increased in price, and thus generated a positive return, will continue to do so. Researchers have 
related this factor to the “bandwagon effect”—as investors see a security increasing in price, they 
react quickly to purchase that security and others follow suit. This factor incorporates yet another 
asset pricing anomaly apart from size and value premiums, and further contradicts market 
efficiency (“Zacks Investment Research: Equity Market Anomalies for August 18, 2011”, 2011). 
The CAPM Model, the Fama & French 3-Factor Model, and the Carhart Four-Factor 
Model have served as useful tools for investors, while continuing to challenge the efficient 
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market hypothesis.  However, these empirical models have various limitations and fail to account 
for a wide array of asset pricing anomalies. Investors continuously seek to understand these 
anomaly variables that impact security and portfolio returns, and it is clear that the varying asset 
prices across several different factors have yet to be totally explained. More importantly, the 
optimal investment approach has yet to be identified (Hou, Xue, Zhang, 2014). 
 
PURPOSE 
My research stems from the research and publication of “Digesting Anomalies: An 
Investment Approach,” written by Kewei Hou, a professor at The Ohio State University and 
China Academy of Financial Research, Chen Xue, a professor at the University of Cincinnati, 
and Lu Zhang, a professor at The Ohio State University and National Bureau of Economic 
Research. This publication revolves around: the explanation of the shortcomings of established 
factors models that attempt to explain asset pricing anomalies, the proposition of an additional 
model called the ‘q-factor model’ that further attempts to capture additional explanation of 
differences in asset pricing and returns, and conclusions that these authors drew as it relates to a 
list of over eighty different anomaly variables. These anomaly variables studied in the 
development of the “q-factor model” were tested for significance in terms of a return spread over 
a span of approximately sixty years (Hou, Xue, Zhang, 2014). 
The purpose of this study is to further examine asset price anomalies, the development of 
investment strategies, and the success of each investment strategy throughout economic upward 
and downward trends. By analyzing a set of anomaly variables, particularly amongst those that 
resulted in statistical significance in terms of a return spread across three definitive time periods: 
pre-financial crisis (2000-2006), the financial crisis (2007-2008), and post financial crisis (2009-
 13 
2013), the effectiveness of these investment strategies across varying economic conditions can 
be understood. Additionally, conclusions can be drawn about whether or not these investment 
approach or approaches are more profitable depending on the business cycle. Finally, it is 
important to fully uncover the long-term implications of the various business cycles, specifically 
economic downturns, as it relates to investment strategies. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
I selected a particular set of anomaly variables that have consistently appeared in various 
investment strategies, specifically amongst those that resulted in statistical significance in terms 
of a return spread. The anomaly variables that I have selected to test include: 
Table 1: 
Investment Strategy Factor 
Momentum Price Momentum 
Value-versus-growth Book-to-Market Equity 
Investment Investment-to-assets, Net Operating 
Assets, & Operating Accruals 
Profitability Return on Equity 
Intangibles R&D-to-Market 
Trading Frictions Market Equity 
 
Using these variables, I will test these anomalies across three definitive time periods: pre-
financial crisis (2000-2006), the financial crisis (2007-2008), and post financial crisis (2009-
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2013). I anticipate that I will obtain the following results as it relates to the anomalies listed 
above: 
1. Momentum: Price Momentum 
There is strong evidence that shows that over time those securities that are experiencing an 
increase in stock price continue to do so in the long run due to a “bandwagon effect”. This 
effect also works in the opposite direction, meaning that those securities that are experiencing 
a decrease in stock price continue to do so in the long run. Further evidence suggests that 
portfolios invested in momentum stocks experience significant returns, but with these highly 
positive returns comes a great amount of volatility (“Zacks Investment Research: Equity 
Market Anomalies for August 18, 2011,” 2011). Therefore, I predict that this anomaly will 
hold true in the long run across the three distinct periods that I intend to test. However, I 
expect varying results during each period because of the level of volatility associated with 
momentum stocks. 
 
2. Value-versus growth: Book-to-Market Equity 
Historical performance shows that value stocks typically outperform growth stocks in the 
long run. However, during times of economic uncertainty, growth stocks are more favorable, 
and thus generate higher returns that value stocks because ‘growth’ implies that the company 
is still increasingly generating revenue despite economic conditions. Moreover, during times 
of economic stability, value stocks redeem their favorability because of their strong 
fundamentals (“Zacks Investment Research: Equity Market Anomalies for June 24, 2011,” 
2011). Based on this evidence, I predict that value stocks outperformed growth stocks 
leading up to the financial crisis. During the financial crisis, I would expect that growth 
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stocks generated higher returns than value stocks. Finally, during the post-financial crisis, I 
predict that growth stocks continued to outperform value stocks for some time due to a lack 
of investor confidence in the market. 
 
3. Investment: Investment-to-assets, Net Operating Assets, and Operating Accruals 
Historical data suggests that those firms with low investment factors (i.e. investment-to-
asset ratio, Net Operating Assets, and Operating Accruals) outperform those firms with high 
investment factors in the long run. The intuition behind this emphasized by Fama and French 
is that “accruals and investment co-vary with rational variation in expected stock returns: a 
lower cost of equity should naturally lead to more investment” (Resutek & Lewellen, 2016). 
In other words, a lower cost of equity, which implies lower expected returns, is related to 
higher levels of investment. Moreover, I expect that leading up to the financial crisis when 
there was a higher cost of equity, implying higher expected returns, firms with low 
investment factors outperformed those firms with high investment factors; likewise, I believe 
this to also be true during the time period following the financial crisis. However, I predict 
that during the financial crisis, firms with high investment factors outperformed those firms 
with low investment factors because high investment factors may have been a result of a 
more financially sound company that was still growing despite economic conditions. 
 
4. Profitability: Return on Equity 
There is strong evidence that shows that in the long run, firms with high returns on equity 
outperform those firms with low returns on equity. The intuition behind this anomaly is best 
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explained in the article, NBER Reporter 2014 Number 1: Research Summary- Exploring 
Asset Pricing Anomalies, written by Lu Zhang: 
All else equal, high expected returns, which translate into high costs of capital, imply low 
NPVs of new capital and therefore low investment; low expected returns imply high 
NPVs of new capital and therefore high investment. In addition, high ROE relative to low 
investment must imply high costs of capital, which are necessary to offset the high ROE 
to induce low NPVs for new capital and therefore low investment. Conversely, low ROE 
relative to high investment must imply low costs of capital, which are necessary to offset 
the low ROE to induce high NPVs for new capital and therefore high investment (Zhang 
2014). 
Therefore, I predict that throughout the three distinct time periods that I will be testing, those 
firms with high returns on equity outperformed those firms with low returns on equity every 
time. I do not expect that this factor will vary between business cycles because it is a direct 
measure of a firm’s profitability. 
 
5. Intangibles: R&D-to-Market 
Those firms that invest in R&D are financially constrained because the capital tied up in 
R&D projects is relatively inflexible. Therefore, there is a subsequent level of risk associated 
with firms who invest moderately or heavily in R&D (Li, 2011). However, in the long run 
those firms that do invest in R&D generate higher returns than those firms that do not invest 
in R&D (Hou, Xue, Zhang, 2014). Therefore, I predict that leading up to the financial crisis, 
those firms investing in R&D generated higher returns than those that didn’t because 
investors would have assumed the subsequent level of risk given the relatively stable 
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economic conditions. However, during the financial crisis and into the post-financial crisis 
period, I expect that R&D intensive firms underperformed compared to less R&D intensive 
firms because investors were more risk averse given the lack of uncertainty during these time 
periods. 
 
6. Trading Frictions: Market Equity 
Evidence shows that in the long-run small market capitalization firms outperform large 
market capitalization firms. However, additional evidence shows that during times of 
uncertainty, such as during a financial crisis, large cap firms outperform small cap firms because 
investors believe there to be less risk associated with large cap firms (“Zacks Investment 
Research: Equity Market Anomalies for July 28, 2011,” 2011). Therefore, I predict that leading 
up to the financial crisis, there will be a significant spread between small cap firms and large cap 
firms, with small capitalization firms outperforming the large capitalization firms. However, 
during the financial crisis, I anticipate that this anomaly will experience a reversal and large cap 
firms will outperform small cap firms due to a lack of the perceived level of risk associated with 
large cap firms. Finally, during the post-financial crisis period, I expect that small cap firms will 
ultimately trump large cap firms with higher returns, as the level of uncertainty diminishes. 
 
 METHODOLOGY  
My research began with selecting particular criteria or "signals" that proved to be 
statistically significant in generating abnormal returns over the past several decades. I ultimately 
chose eight anomalies that I hypothesized would show predictive power across the most recent 
business cycle, and more specifically, anomalies that I believed would vary within the business 
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cycle sample periods that I had defined. Again, these sample periods include: a contractionary 
period prior to the great recession (2000-2006), the financial crisis itself (2007-2009), and the 
recovery period (2010-2013). These economic cycles are depicted in the graph below. 
 
 (Womack, 2003) 
 
I was then able to collect secondary, firm-level data on a monthly basis for all public 
firms on domestic exchanges. For each factor, I separated the firms into quintiles and found the 
average monthly, abnormal returns for each group. Then, I found the difference between these 
monthly averages of the extreme quintile groups. Thus, I created a distinct portfolio for each 
factor that represented the difference in average monthly, abnormal returns between the two 
extreme quintiles for all months within 2000-2013. The differences in average monthly returns 
were calculated for each portfolio were calculated as follows: 
1. Price Momentum: (highest quintile – lowest quintile) 
2. Book-to-Market Equity: (highest quintile – lowest quintile) 
3. Investment-to-assets: (lowest quintile – highest quintile) 
4.  Net Operating Assets: (lowest quintile – highest quintile) 
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5. Operating Accruals: (lowest quintile – highest quintile) 
6. Return on Equity: (highest quintile – lowest quintile) 
7. R&D-to-Market: (highest quintile – lowest quintile) 
8. Market Equity: (lowest quintile – highest quintile) 
After creating these portfolios, for each factor, I found the population mean of the entire time 
period as well as the sample means for each sample period that I was evaluating. I also calculated 
the t-stat for the entire population and sample populations to test for significance at a 10% level. 
Finally, I identified those strategies that showed statistical significance over the entire business 
cycle and/or within a particular sample period, which allowed me to draw my conclusions. 
 
RESULTS 
The results of this study were quite fascinating and carry several implications. The table below 
shows the summary of abnormal returns categorized by each factor. 
Table 2: 
Book to Market 
Sample Period 2000-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2000-2013 
Average Abnormal Return (%) 1.907142857 0.360833333 0.384791667 1.140833333 
Standard Deviation 5.206470389 5.010231961 3.090196571 4.693638224 
n 84 36 48 168 
t-stat 3.357217405 0.432115722 0.86270074 3.150411114 
Investment to Assets 
Sample Period 2000-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2000-2013 
Average Abnormal Return (%) 1.350238095 -0.603888889 0.459375 0.676964286 
Standard Deviation 4.648256566 3.164964699 2.58301276 3.908877679 
n 84 36 48 168 
t-stat 2.662317878 -1.144825829 1.232143878 2.244751746 
Market Equity 
Sample Period 2000-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2000-2013 
Average Abnormal Return (%) 1.795952381 -0.211666667 0.288541667 0.935059524 
Standard Deviation 7.171779386 4.772894824 3.25066801 5.832715307 
n 84 36 48 168 
t-stat 2.295131316 -0.266085897 0.614973692 2.077892711 
Net Operating Assets 
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Sample Period 2000-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2000-2013 
Average Abnormal Return (%) 0.690119048 0.139444444 0.125625 0.410833333 
Standard Deviation 3.632479154 3.121457053 2.202814357 3.168965284 
n 84 36 48 168 
t-stat 1.741247583 0.268037219 0.395110704 1.680361926 
Operating Accruals 
Sample Period 2000-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2000-2013 
Average Abnormal Return (%) -0.088214286 0.695277778 -0.263125 0.029702381 
Standard Deviation 3.383101935 2.239273799 3.206001789 3.119448865 
n 84 36 48 168 
t-stat -0.238981059 1.862955155 -0.568615863 0.123415025 
Momentum 
Sample Period 2000-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2000-2013 
Average Abnormal Return (%) 0.296071429 -1.053055556 0.804166667 0.152142857 
Standard Deviation 9.670625255 12.80284882 4.69138406 9.37701465 
n 84 36 48 168 
t-stat 0.280596073 -0.493509954 1.18758772 0.210301134 
R&D-to-Market 
Sample Period 2000-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2000-2013 
Average Abnormal Return (%) 0.51702381 0.485277778 0.29875 0.447857143 
Standard Deviation 7.346712367 5.661521432 2.705327781 5.96580625 
n 84 36 48 168 
t-stat 0.64499619 0.514290496 0.765083155 0.973027246 
ROE 
Sample Period 2000-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2000-2013 
Average Abnormal Return (%) 1.023214286 0.787777778 -0.033125 0.670952381 
Standard Deviation 8.488113895 5.321811049 3.232703997 6.692856821 
n 84 36 48 168 
t-stat 1.104828935 0.888168825 -0.070992189 1.299375892 
 
As shown in the results summary, during the pre-financial crisis (2000-2006), my 
analysis demonstrated that the factors including: book-to-market, investment-to-assets, market 
equity, and net operating assets proved to be statistically significant in generating positive 
abnormal returns during this period (1.907%, 1.350%, 1.796%, .6901%, respectively). During 
the financial crisis (2007-2009), the only factor that showed a statistically significant result was 
operating accruals, producing a positive abnormal return of .6953%. Finally, during the post-
financial crisis, my analysis did not exhibit any statistically significant evidence linking those 
factors tested and abnormal returns. 
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Furthermore, looking at the entire business cycle, factors including: book-to-market, 
investment-to-assets, market equity, and net operating assets showed statically significant 
evidence in generating excess returns from 2000 to 2013 (1.141%, .6770%, .9351%, .4108%, 
respectively). Interestingly enough, although operating accruals showed statistically significant 
evidence in producing positive abnormal returns during the financial crisis, it did not prove to be 
statistically significant over the entire business cycle. In comparing the results of the entire 
business cycle to the results of the individual sample periods, I was able uncover several key 
findings related to these anomalies and draw various conclusions. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Based off of the results of my study I was able to form several powerful conclusions. 
Most importantly, there is significant evidence (at a 10% level) that markets are not completely 
efficient. In other words, six out of eight of these market anomalies generated abnormal returns 
during this particular business cycle. If markets were efficient, there could not be statistically 
significant evidence that abnormal returns were linked to these various factors. 
 Furthermore, it is obvious that investment strategies’ and their associated signals’ 
effectiveness are linked to economic conditions. This study demonstrated that depending on 
where the economy is at in a business cycle, an investment strategy’s success may change 
(positively or negatively). This can be inferred by the fact that not all of the factors analyzed of 
which showed statistically significant evidence of generating excess returns did so in every 
sample period.  
 Additionally, it is clear that the time horizon impacted asset pricing anomalies, as the 
results indicate that over a longer time horizon the anomalies are more significant, and in most 
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cases more profitable (generate a higher abnormal return). For instance, the pre-financial crisis 
period (2000-2006) was the longest sample period tested, and showed more statistically 
significant evidence. Likewise, over the entire sample period, several of the factors proved to be 
statistically significant evidence as well. That said, more research must to be done to understand 
the relationship between each factor and various time horizons.  
 More specifically, my results were telling in terms of which investment strategies may 
prove to be profitable during various economic cycles and across an entire business cycle. 
Furthermore, my analysis shows that leading up to the financial crisis, factors including: book-
to-market, investment-to-assets, market equity, and net operating assets, proved to return a 
positive excess return above the market. This indicates that investing in a portfolio of value 
stocks, or stocks with high book-to-market ratios, will produce abnormal returns during a 
contractionary economic cycle. Similarly, investing in portfolios that include firms with low 
investment, specifically those with low investment-to-assets ratios and/or low net operating 
assets, will also produce excess returns during a contractionary period. Finally, investing in 
portfolios with low trading frictions, particularly low market equity, will result in abnormal 
returns during a contractionary period. These same strategies and related factors generate an 
excess return over an entire business cycle, if held throughout the varying economic conditions 
(contraction, trough, and expansion). 
 Additionally, during the financial crisis, the only successful strategy was again, investing 
in firms with low investment, but more specifically those firms with low operating accruals. The 
other factors under the “investment strategy umbrella,” investments-to-assets and net operating 
assets, were not successful in generating an excess return with statistical significance. Further 
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research must be done to find the delineating variable that partitions the investment strategy’s 
effectiveness across economic conditions.  
 Finally, it’s clear that during the post-financial crisis, these factors’ ability to produce 
abnormal returns was not significant. It can be concluded that during a recovery period, these 
strategies are less impactful. Given the amount of uncertainty present in the markets coming out 
of an economic downturn, this result is not surprising. 
 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
First and foremost, my further research will revolve around: why so particular anomalies 
produce excess returns during varying business cycles? I intend to attempt to understand what 
about economic conditions in particular impact the markets, and why these various strategies’ 
effectiveness is linked to these economic conditions. More specifically, I want to investigate 
whether or not it is investor behavior that guides market, especially as it relates to investor 
expectations. For instance, is there a link between investors’ expectations and the lack of 
statistically significant evidence of a successful strategy during the recovery period? These are 
all questions that need further due diligence. 
Moreover, I would also like to investigate if my results are specific to this particular 
business cycle. In other words, would the results change if I were to test the same factors over 
multiple business cycles, or would they remain the same. Similarly, I would like to understand if 
the overall time horizon enhances the effectiveness of these strategies. 
Finally, the anomaly based on operating accruals returned a statistically significant return 
beyond that of the market in a single sample period, but not across the entire business cycle. This 
indicates that this factor was specifically impacted by the trough, or the financial crisis. That 
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said, it’s important to recognize that this factor is related to the “investment” strategy, or the 
strategy that suggests that investing in firms with low investment as opposed to those with high 
investment will produce abnormal returns. Other factors under the umbrella of this strategy 
include investment-to-assets and net operating assets, which showed statistically significant 
evidence in producing positive abnormal returns in the contractionary period and over the entire 
business cycle. I intend to conduct further research to understand what separates these factors, 
particularly as it relates to their varying effectiveness across a business cycle. More importantly, 
I would like to understand the fundamental cause for the operating accruals factor’s success 
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